over the historically promoted goal of investor protection. 
INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding has recently become a powerful mechanism for entrepreneurs and startups to raise early-stage capital.
1 Crowdfunding is essentially a tool to attract a new pool of people -not the traditional banks and wealthy investors -via the Internet or social media networks to contribute to a funding target or project of the entrepreneur or startup.
2 Historically, in the United States, small businesses have struggled to raise seed capital.
3 Most of the traditional funding channels, namely banks, private equity investors, angel investors, and venture capitalists, have been unwilling "to touch [for instance] a consumer products company until it surpassed $10 million in sales."
4 Moreover, according to the Small Business Administration, "U.S. banks . . . held $607 billion in outstanding small business loans of $1 million or less during 2011." 5 But as small businesses, startups, and non-profits have begun to embrace crowdfunding, and as governments around the world have started to recognize this enthusiasm and spearhead reforms in this area, crowdfunding has become increasingly competitive with the traditional funding channels.
6
In April 2012, the U.S. Congress passed a "game-changing" law: the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act ("CROWDFUND Act") -the short title of Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act ("JOBS Act").
7 This new law created a revolutionary avenue of capital formation for small and new businesses: equity crowdfunding.
8 With the aim of reducing compliance costs for small businesses, the JOBS Act focused more on forming capital than on protecting investors, 9 and it tasked the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") with publishing regulations and rules to address these two, often mutually exclusive, goals in order for the CROWDFUND Act to be implemented. he Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act has changed the landscape of the dialogue on helping small businesses raise capital. . . . The JOBS Act -given its goal of spurring economic growth and job creation by making it easier for businesses to find funding -is a significant step in the right direction. . . . . [I] t's imperative that we not only use this Forum, but the mandates in the JOBS Act, to focus our attention and time on small business issues to facilitate capital formation . . . .").
10 Stacy Cowley, S.E.C. Gives Small Investors Access to Equity Crowdfunding, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015) , http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/business/dealbook/ sec-gives-small-investors-access-to-equity-crowdfunding.html. See also Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, Historically, U.S. federal securities laws have tended to swing towards the goal of investor protection. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") 11 placed heavy burdens on both large and small companies; specifically, SOX not only strengthened mandated disclosures but also interfered with internal corporate governance.
12 Although its goal was to protect investors, it neglected the importance of promoting capital formation either through offering legal flexibility or avoiding excessive burdens.
13 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank") 14 exempted small issuers from Section 404(b) of SOX;
15 however, it further tightened protective measures for investors.
The CROWDFUND Act -which created a groundbreaking exemption for equity crowdfunding (in effect "overturning eighty-year old securities laws and decades of legal precedent"
16
) -now tends to swing towards the other side of the balance, of promoting capital formation by small businesses.
17 Even within the scope of the SEC's various drafts and promulgations since 2012, the trend is noticeably more favorable towards capital formation. 18 As recently adopted by the SEC in October 2015,
19
while certain protective measures will likely emerge, the JOBS Act will now expand to include non-accredited investor participations and allow startups and small businesses to raise up to $1 million within a year and 239, 240, and 249) (SEC's proposal on Crowdfunding, which was originally published online to the public). make offers via Broker-Dealer or Portal Intermediary. 20 Thus, effective 2016 in the U.S., entrepreneurs will have a wide variety of options for how they want to go about capital formation.
21
But before the 2012 version of the Act could feasibly be implemented in the U.S., the idea of using equity crowdfunding extended over to Taiwan as well. In January 2014, the Taiwanese government established its first equity crowdfunding platform, the Go Incubation Board for Startup and Acceleration ("GISA Board") 22 -one similar to those that will now be authorized under the CROWDFUND Act, such as IndieGogo and SeedInvest. 23 The main difference between the GISA Board and those equity crowdfunding platforms now legalized by the CROWDFUND Act is that the Taiwanese platform is public, run by GreTai Securities Market ("GTSM"), a quasi-governmental organization -not by a private forprofit entity.
24 The different regulatory features may be attributed to the surrounding circumstances; as comparative law scholars argue, were transplanted into the Regulations Governing the Go Incubation Board for Startup and Acceleration Firms ("GISA Regulations"), 27 the GISA Regulations are more concerned with protecting investors both in theory and in practice, than the CROWDFUND Act, as initially passed in 2012, is in theory. A year later, in April 2015, the Taiwanese government also passed the Private Portal Regulations, which authorized the use of private portals to run equity crowdfunding.
28
The enactment of both the GISA Regulations and the Private Portal Regulations might have occurred due to local market trends as well as the practice of concomitant adaptation. However, from a public choice perspective, the legal innovation of Taiwan's regulations in practice was likely due to bureaucratic incentives to run equity crowdfunding by a government-controlled organization, such as the GTSM, and not due to mere lobbying by interest groups, such as existing securities firms. What is perplexing is that the GTSM is the very regulator enacting and enforcing the Private Portal Regulations, even as it competes with other regulated private funding portals. Therefore, as this Article argues, the aforementioned Regulations tend to favor investor protection much more than the CROWDFUND Act, the transplanted or patterned-after law; this, in turn, may saddle startups in Taiwan with unbearable compliance costs in practice and ultimately compromise the goal of small business capital formation.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I provides an overview of the analytical framework of scholars Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini, and Avi Goldfarb ("Agrawal et al. tory regime of equity crowdfunding in the United States. Part II discusses the development of crowdfunding in Taiwan and delves into the GISA Regulations from a doctrinal perspective. Then, employing a qualitative approach to the legal issues related to the GISA Regulations, through interviews with participants in Taiwan's crowdfunding market, Part III provides a critique of the creation of the GISA Board and the Private Portal Regulations from a public choice perspective. This Article concludes by arguing that Taiwan's legal transplant of the U.S. equity crowdfunding law is turning out to be of more of form, of copying the texts, than of substance, of pursuing capital formation in practice.
I. EQUITY CROWDFUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES
As discussed above, crowdfunding is an evolving method of raising money, in which ordinary people can make investments using their online or social media networks.
30 This idea of investments online originated from the idea of "crowdsourcing," which is "a type of participative online activity in which an individual, an institution, a nonprofit organization, or company proposes to a group of individuals . . . via a flexible open call, the voluntary undertaking of a task."
31
Among the various types of crowdfunding, equity crowdfunding will now allow people to purchase equity or ownership interests in the business projects in which they invest.
32 Equity crowdfunding could not be tapped, however, before the adoption of the final "Regulation Crowdfunding" of the JOBS Act. Such offering and sale of securities otherwise triggered the application of the federal securities laws, which would require such securities to be registered with the SEC, unless an exemption applied. Since the exact scope of the SEC final rules for the CROWDFUND Act remains unknown in practice, the initial texts of the JOBS Act from 2012, as well as the early research on non-equity crowdfunding could, to an extent, help illustrate the characteristics of equity crowdfunding.
37 As demonstrated below, under the framework of Agrawal et al., the economic principles governing non-equity crowdfunding likely apply to equity crowdfunding as well, with a few nuances noted.
A. An Economic Analysis of Equity-Crowdfunding Regulation
Agrawal et al.'s framework analyzes the incentives and disincentives of three primary participants in the crowdfunding market: platforms, creators, and funders.
38 Focusing on disincentives, Agrawal et al. illustrate several kinds of potential sources of market failures and then propose market design features and strategies to reduce disincentives as well as the possibility of market failure.
39 This Article largely follows this framework, identifying the major participants in the crowdfunding market to examine their motivations, to map such incentives onto the newly developing equity crowdfunding market, and to address related legal and regulatory issues. However, it is important to note that this Article also adds the government as the fourth major participant in equity crowdfunding, discussed in detail below. 43 As such, their incentive for engaging in crowdfunding is to "maximize the number and size of successful projects" by "attracting a large community of funders and creators as well as [by] designing the market to attract high-quality projects, reduce fraud, and facilitate efficient matching between ideas and capital."
44 Similarly, in Taiwan, nonequity crowdfunding platforms are for-profit businesses too. For example, the largest non-equity crowdfunding platform in Taiwan, flyingV, has a revenue model based on a transaction fee (equivalent to 8 percent of the total funding amount) for successful projects.
45
However, depending on the nature of the platform, the incentive sometimes may be not-for-profit in principle. As will be discussed below about the government's role and incentive, the public platform may not be as focused on innovation or creativity in a capital-raising project, as on the implementation of prevailing government policies.
46 Nevertheless, the same incentives, whether the platform is public or private, likely govern equity crowdfunding since the only difference is the nature of the exchanged properties, rather than the inherent mechanisms or structure of the exchange via the platform. 
Creator Motivations
Creators of small businesses and startups, or alternatively "issuers" in the equity context, may choose crowdfunding to raise capital because it lowers costs and provides greater access to information, among many other reasons.
47 Under the non-equity crowdfunding system, creators have no geographical limitations and can match with those individuals who are the most willing to invest in the creator's business, perhaps in exchange for "early access to products, recognition for discovering innovations, participating in a new venture's community of supporters, and other non-pecuniary rewards."
48
Moreover, to the extent that crowdfunding online usually generates more information than other traditional avenues -particularly information about the other investors' interests, the current ideas of product modifications, and the extensions from potential uses -such information may increase funders' willingness to pay and thereby lower the cost of capital.
49 Through the increase in information and engagement with users, creators also benefit from user-driven innovation since their feedback may help creators develop products that better match the need of future users.
50
These incentives apply to investors in both the U.S. and Taiwan. Creators may face some disincentives in crowdfunding, the greatest of which is that they must disclose their innovations to the public, and such disclosure may attract imitation. 51 The same phenomena would seem to apply to equity crowdfunding, where the quid pro quo would now be equity in the small business or startup.
Funder Motivations
Investors engaging in crowdfunding generally have five incentives: (1) increased access to investment opportunities; (2) early access to new products; (3) increased participation in social activities or online communities; (4) demonstrated support for the ideas or innovations of the projects they fund in a philanthropic way; and (5) formalization of otherwise informal financial contracts.
52
To be sure, investors also face several risks or disincentives in crowdfunding, including: (1) possible failure to deliver products, to generate equity value, or to meet the milestones of projects; (2) fraud; and (3) increased likelihood of failure of these early-stage projects.
53 These three risks arise due to the information asymmetry between project creators 47 See Agrawal et al., supra note 29, at 10-13. 48 Id. at 10-11. 49 Id. at 11. 50 Id. at 13. 51 Id. at 16. 52 Id. at 14-15. 53 Id. at 18-20. and crowdfunders, and while such risks likely apply to equity crowdfunding, the nature of the property, that is, stocks, may exacerbate this asymmetry.
54 But by and large, these incentives and risks similarly seem to apply to the equity crowdfunding setting.
Government Motivations
This Article regards the government as the fourth participant in the crowdfunding market, for both private and public platforms. Overall, the government plays an important role in facilitating equity crowdfunding, because equity crowdfunding can only be undertaken if the government provides exemptions from securities law registration requirements.
55
With respect to private portals, as the SEC Chair Mary Jo White observed, " [t] here is a great deal of enthusiasm in the marketplace for crowdfunding, and these rules and proposed amendments provide smaller companies with innovative ways to raise capital and give investors the protections they need."
56 In this respect, the incentive of the government may be to adapt to the current economic conditions and growing popularity and trends, as well as to encourage economic growth.
As provided in the initial text of the CROWDFUND Act, the SEC follows the approach of soft or libertarian paternalism to implement the CROWDFUND Act with more flexible rules, 57 in order to promote small business capital formation. In Taiwan, even though the GTSM clearly indicates that the GISA Regulations are patterned after the CROWDFUND Act, 58 their practical or actual goal may differ from that of capital formation mainly voiced under the U.S. model, due to the Taiwanese government's preferences for a higher level of investor protection. In Part III, we will take a closer look at the GISA Regulations based on interviews with major actors in Taiwan's crowdfunding market to uncover the scope of the Government's motivations.
B. A New Crowdfunding Exemption: Title III of the JOBS Act of 2012
When Congress passed the JOBS Act in 2012, it legalized a revolutionary avenue of capital funding, by including an exemption to permit secur- ities-based crowdfunding and by creating a "funding portal" to "allow Internet-based platforms or intermediaries to facilitate the offer and sale of securities without having to register with the SEC as brokers." 59 The Act also tasked the SEC with adopting the rules and regulations to balance the two goals of investor protection and capital formation, by the fall of 2012.
60
The SEC initially released a set of draft rules in October 2013, which were criticized for being "too costly and complex."
61 Then, in October 2015, two years later, the SEC adopted the final rules, "Regulation Crowdfunding," to permit new and small companies to use equity crowdfunding, and the JOBS Act will finally take effect this year.
62 The final rules address many of the earlier concerns and provide a regulatory framework for facilitating equity crowdfunding transactions.
63
In essence, the final rules expand the portals into the nonaccredited markets, set particular investment limits, and require companies to disclose certain information about the company.
64
However, for the purposes of this comparative analysis, the initial text of the JOBS Act from 2012, as referred to by the Taiwanese government when promulgating the GISA Regulations in January 2014 and the Private Portal Regulations in April 2015, constitutes the U.S. model here. Thus, the primary areas governing registration requirements, investments caps, resale restrictions, and funding portal requirements are based on the initial 2012 text of the JOBS Act, each of which will be summarized below.
An Exemption from Registration Requirements
Section 4(a)(6) of the JOBS Act, an amendment to the Securities Act of 1933, allows startup entrepreneurs to try to raise equity capital through crowdfunding.
65 If securities offerings are exempt transactions, entrepreneurs cannot resell those securities unless they are registered with the SEC or unless other exemptions are available, while the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are applied in principle.
66 According to the CROWDFUND Act, the sale of securities by non-reporting companies through crowdfunding, totaling up to $1,000,000 in a twelve-month period, is exempt from the SEC registration. 67 The CROWDFUND Act not only requires nonreporting firms to make non-trivial disclosures, 68 but also adopts a funding threshold to prevent issuers from taking funds from investors under some circumstances. 
Investment Caps for Investors
The CROWDFUND Act introduced a new regulatory technique: investment caps.
70 For investors whose annual income or net worth is less than $100,000, the annual investment cap is the greater of either $2,000 or five percent of their annual income or net worth.
71 If investors have an annual income or net worth of more than $100,000, they can invest ten percent of this amount in crowdfunded shares, subject to a "maximum aggregate amount sold of $100,000." 
The Resale of Crowdfunded Securities
Under the Act, investors cannot transfer or resell the crowdfunded securities within one year subsequent to the date of purchase, unless they resell to the issuer, to an accredited investor, or to a family member of the purchaser, or if the resale or transfer is part of an offering registered with the SEC. 68 COX ET AL., supra note 65, at 312. 69 Agrawal et al., supra note 29, at 27. From an economic perspective, this threshold is a provision point mechanism to address the market failure of coordination among investors because of the free-rider problem. As briefly defined, "the creator only receives the funds if a funding threshold level is reached or surpassed within a certain period of time." Id. at 31. The CROWDFUND Act specifies the likelihood of this mechanism to be mandated, as crowdfunding intermediaries would have to "ensure that all offering proceeds are only provided to the issuer when the aggregate capital raised from all investors is equal to or greater than a target offering amount, and allow all investors to cancel their commitments to invest, as the Commission shall, by rule, determine appropriate. 
Requirements for Funding Portals
Because the transaction must be made through a government-certified crowdfunding platform, platforms must register as a funding portal or as a broker with the SEC and with self-regulatory organizations, such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. ("FINRA").
74 Furthermore, besides disclosing crowdfunded security risks, funding portals must educate investors and make sure that investors affirm that they understand the level of risk in startups and small issuers and the risk of illiquidity.
75 Portals must also make sure that investors do not invest more than the aggregate amounts that they may statutorily purchase across all platforms.
76
Although these elements were tweaked in the October 2015 final rules, these aforementioned elements were the ones that influenced and were selectively translated into the Taiwanese system in early 2015.
II. THE LEGAL INNOVATION OF EQUITY-CROWDFUNDING REGULATION IN TAIWAN: A FOCUS ON THE GISA BOARD
Non-equity crowdfunding platforms began to emerge in Taiwan in 2012. When it comes to the consideration that funders receive, crowdfunding projects have relied on the pre-purchase, reward, and donation models.
77 In terms of the equity model, however, although the founder of flyingV once attempted to design a private equity crowdfunding platform, flyingVC, 78 in a private-placement form similar to the business model adopted by AngelList 79 in the United States, this plan was suspended, possibly due to the absence of clear authorization of private crowdfunding platforms from Taiwan's government prior to 2015.
80 In addition to introducing the first legitimate equity crowdfunding platform 74 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 67, at 10-11. 75 Id. at 11. 76 COX ET AL., supra note 65, at 312. in Taiwan, the GISA Board has several major components regulated under the GISA Regulations, which will be discussed below.
A. The Beginning of Equity Crowdfunding in Taiwan
Before the authorization of private crowdfunding platforms at the end of April 2015, the only exception to the prohibition on running an equity crowdfunding platform was the GISA Board, a Financial Supervisory Commission ("FSC") supported funding portal created by a quasi-governmental foundation, the GTSM. 81 The rules and legal issues regarding the GISA Board are worth studying because it began operations in January 2014 in Taiwan, and so it is unique in its public capacity, as compared to all of the other current crowdfunding portals in the world. In 2013, one of the FSC's main annual responsibilities was to prepare for the creation of the GISA Board. According to the GISA Board's website, its second official goal is to support small innovative companies and to help these potential startups raise the capital they need.
82
Interestingly, though the equity crowdfunding law passed in the United States first, Taiwan has been able to develop its laws and regulations in more detail, and as such, I will now turn to the major components in Taiwan's system.
B. Examining Components of the GISA Regulations
On its face, many of the GISA Regulations share similar characteristics and rules with the CROWDFUND Act of 2012 in the U.S. This Section highlights a number of the legal issues raised regarding the types of issuers permitted, the investment caps, the disclosure requirements, the scope of the exemption, and the resale restrictions for equity crowdfunding in Taiwan.
Types of Issuers
According to the GISA Regulations, startups must meet the following requirements to apply to the GISA Board: (1) the applicants must be companies limited by shares, that is, limited companies, or preparatory offices for the incorporation of a company by public offering under Taiwan's Company Act;
83 (2) in principle, the total paid-in capital or the total paid-in capital planned for incorporation by public offering must be NT$50 million or less (this requirement illustrates that the GISA Board targets small companies); 84 and (3) companies need to have innovative or creative concepts and future development potential. 85 The total par value of capital stock offered for subscription by investors through the GISA Board may not exceed NT$15 million.
86 As in the case of the CROWDFUND Act, there is also a funding cap on the capital to be raised in the case of GISA shares in Taiwan. Moreover, those allowed to register on the GISA Board are limited to non-publicly traded companies.
87

Investment Caps
Investments made by a non-professional investor through the GISA Board during the preceding year may not exceed NT$150,000.
88 This investment cap does not apply to the original shareholders of the issuer or a professional investor.
89
"Professional investors" encompass four categories: (1) foreign or domestic banks, insurance companies, securities firms, pension funds, mutual funds, unit trusts, and any other institutions approved by the competent authority; (2) juristic persons or funds whose total assets, as stated in a CPA-audited or -reviewed financial report for the most recent period, exceed NT$50 million; (3) natural persons who provide proof of financial capacity showing assets of NT$30 million or more, and who also possess ample professional knowledge of financial products or have ample trading experience; and (4) trust enterprises in a trust agreement with a trustor who falls within the preceding second and third categories.
90 Table 1 below summarizes these regulations. 91 The significance of these specific categories lies in the fact that the categorization of professional and non-professional investors here are basically patterned after the differentiation of accredited and non-accredited investors under the CROWDFUND Act. Once a startup registers on the GISA Board to raise capital, it must disclose information about the startup.
93 However, because the GISA Board is still regarded as a relatively small business, it is not suitable for a privately traded startup to comply with disclosure requirements as demanding as those applied to public companies.
The GISA Regulations impose requirements for the eight types of basic information a startup must disclose on the GTSM website, 94 and it provides the twelve specific circumstances under which the startup must disclose such material information. 95 Specifically, the eight types of basic information include: (1) basic company information; (2) information on company insider shareholdings; (3) dates of regular and special shareholders meetings and related issues; (4) financial reports; (5) dividend distribution for the current year; (6) "shareholders'' meetings minutes; (7) date of record for the company's decision to distribute dividends, bonuses, or other benefits and related issues; and (8) information on a cash capital increase. 96 The significance of these kinds of disclosure requirements will be discussed in more detail below. Furthermore, the GISA Regulations provide an exhaustive list of twelve circumstances, wherein the company on the GISA Board must disclose the following material information:
(1) a loss of creditworthiness; (2) any major litigious or non-litigious matter, or similar legal disputes with a material effect on its finances or business; (3) a major change in its operation with a material impact on company business; (4) a sale of a substantial part of its business or assets; (5) a change in its chairman or general manager; (6) a plan for business cooperation or an important contract, or any change in such a plan or contract with a material effect on its finances or business; (7) a resolution by the board of directors for a capital increase through a new share issue or the record date of a cash capital increase, or a material change in the preceding; (8) a resolution by the board of directors to file with the competent authority following supplementary procedures to register with the competent authority and to be classified as a public company; (9) a resolution by a board of directors or shareholders' meeting to apply for termination of GISA registration; (10) a suspension of the company's qualification to raise capital through the GISA, followed by explanations of the extraordinary circumstances leading to the suspension, of how to resolve the problems, and of subsequent improvement; (11) a suspension of the company's qualification to raise capital through the GISA; and (12) any other circumstances with a material effect on shareholder equity.
98
The implications of this exhaustive list will be drawn below.
The Public Integrative Counseling Mechanism
After receiving a company's application to register on the GISA Board, the GTSM will examine the company's innovation(s) as part of the first-stage examination.
99 If the company passes this first-stage examination, the GTSM's public integrative counseling mechanism ("PICM") will provide comprehensive counseling services, including accounting, internal control, marketing, and regulatory counseling services, to help private and small startups set up internal control, accounting, and corporate governance systems. two years. 101 Although the PICM may help a startup enhance its corporate governance, the obvious goal of this mechanism is to ensure a high level of investor protection, to the point that it might impose excessive burdens on startups, albeit with the GTSM's help. I expand below on the significance of this counseling mechanism and the uniqueness of the government's role in Taiwan's equity crowdfunding market.
102
5. The Scope of the GISA Security Exemption Curiously, the FSC's order 103 characterizes the GISA Board securities as "exempt securities," so that they need not fulfill the registration requirement under Paragraph 1 of Article 22 of the Securities and Exchange Act (the "SE Act").
104 This gap leaves unanswered the question of what law a court should apply in the event of securities antifraud litigation involving a GISA company: the SE Act or the GISA Regulations. This gap also helps illustrate the scope and limitations of the GISA Board securities exemption.
Even though some provisions of the GISA Regulations acknowledge this issue, these rules do not provide a clear legal answer.
105 The SE Act should govern only public companies, but leading Taiwanese scholars assert that the anti-fraud provision (Paragraph 1 of Article 20 of the SE 105 Paragraph 2, Article 22 of the GISA Regulations enacts that "no misrepresentation, concealment, or information sufficient to mislead others may be contained within the" eight types of basic reported information, as introduced in Part II.B.3. GISA REGULATIONS, supra note 27, art. 22, ¶ 2. Meanwhile, Paragraph 3, Article 23 of the GISA Regulations states that no material information required to be reported under the twelve circumstances as mentioned in Part II.B.3 "may contain any descriptions of an exaggerated nature or resemble advertising or promotional language, nor may they involve misrepresentation, concealment, or misleading statements." Id. art. 23, ¶ 3. Also, Paragraph 2, Article 24 of the GISA Regulations provides that "when information reported by a GISA company contains misrepresentations, it will be handled pursuant to the relevant provisions of the GISA Regulations and the GISA company will solely bear the related legal liability." Id. art. 24, ¶ 2. Act) still applies, despite the classification of GISA securities as "exempt securities" that are not publicly traded.
106
In short, the conundrum rests on that securities antifraud liabilities cannot be placed under the GISA Regulations since these Regulations are promulgated by the GTSM, which is merely a government-controlled foundation, free and independent from the legislature or an executive agency authorized by a statute to impose such liabilities.
The Resale of GISA Securities
In addition to the question of the scope of the GISA securities exemption, the resale rule for GISA securities is not clear. In theory, because GISA securities are neither publicly traded nor registered with the FSC, the FSC should regulate more strictly their transfer to protect investors. Currently, however, I opine that there is a loophole in the laws because neither statutory provisions nor the GISA Regulations govern the transfer of GISA securities, which frustrates the main goal of the GISA Regulations by jeopardizing investor protection.
In U.S. securities regulation, both private offerings and equity crowdfunding are now "exempt transactions."
107 This contrasts with the requirements for private offerings in Taiwan, where the government has imposed some restrictions on the transfer of securities placed in private offering or private placement securities.
108 For example, investors may not resell privately placed securities until three full years have elapsed since the delivery date and the privately offering company has since registered previously unregistered securities with the competent authority.
109
Similarly, there should be some restrictions on the transfer of GISA securities, such as the aforementioned lock-up period for transferring privately placed securities in Taiwan.
However, while the text of the CROWDFUND Act and its various promulgations indicate support for the goal of capital formation, the practical reality of the equity crowdfunding exemption is still unclear, and it depends on the development of case law in the U.S. As such, an examination of the on-the-ground effects of equity crowdfunding in Taiwan may provide some insight. 
III. THE LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION OF EQUITY-CROWDFUNDING REGULATION IN TAIWAN: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
Although the U.S. was the first to pass the equity crowdfunding laws in 2012, Taiwan has had a head start on knowing the practical effects of such laws as the GISA Regulations that were promulgated in January 2014 -since the U.S. only recently finalized the JOBS Act, to take effect this year. Part III will dissect a number of legal issues concerning equity crowdfunding (especially with the GISA Board), first from the perspectives of primary participants in the crowdfunding market in Taiwan, and second from a comparative, public choice perspective, looking also to the U.S. regulatory regime.
A. Data and Methods
This Article examines legal issues from the perspectives of major participants in the crowdfunding market by conducting and evaluating indepth in-person interviews. Questions for these in-depth interviews are "semi-structured."
110 This Article employs "purposive sampling" as the sampling strategy, 111 which turns on the thesis of the study and chooses the most relevant samples.
112
The data comes from the following interviewees in Taiwan: (1) an investor: a lawyer specializing in the market for crowdfunding; (2) an issuer: a CEO of a startup with experience in raising capital on the GISA Board; (3) a government representative: an FSC official in charge of the equity crowdfunding market; (4) a private equity crowdfunding platform: a founder of a major non-equity crowdfunding platform who once considered creating a private equity crowdfunding portal; and (5) a public equity crowdfunding platform: a manager in charge of an equity 110 Semi-structured questions are a set of questions predetermined by the author that are related to the identified specific issues; the questions may be extended, depending on the answers of the interviewees. As shown in the table above, each corresponding interviewee represents a different major participant in the Taiwanese crowdfunding market. As the data gathered are confidential, this author preserves each interviewee's anonymity by using letters A through E to correspond with each of the interviewees.
114 In addition, the interview codes are in the form of "Xy," in which "X" is the capitalized symbol from A to E representing respective interviewees, and "y" is the interview question number and their answers for those questions.
B. Creator Issues
This Section explores the legal issues that raise the most concerns for project creators or issuers on the GISA Board -that is, the disclosure requirements and the PICM. This Section also recommends that after reflecting on the short experience of the GISA Board, the GTSMpromulgated regulations governing equity crowdfunding be simplified to strike a balance between investor protection and capital formation.
Disclosure Requirements for the GISA Board
While GISA companies publicly offer their shares in the same manner as public companies, one would assume that the disclosure requirements should be simpler or less burdensome for GISA companies, given the fact that GISA companies are small startups and are less able to assume high regulatory burdens (E7, A1).
115
In practice, however, disclosure requirements under the GISA Regulations are far from simple. The disclosure requirements for GISA companies include the eight basic categories of information on the GTSM website mentioned above, as well as material information under the twelve circumstances listed under the GISA Regulations.
116
On the one hand, the eight requirements for GISA companies 117 and the requirements listed on the GTSM website are simplified and appear less complicated as compared to those for public companies (B39). Additionally, the manager handling the GTSM's equity crowdfunding business observed that on the surface, the material information GISA companies need to disclose under the twelve circumstances (material information disclosure) also appears simplified (B45).
119
However, startups registering on the GISA Board still encounter excessive burdens in abiding by these disclosure rules (C2, C10). 120 For example, Interviewee C, the CEO of the startup with experience in raising capital on the GISA Board, described his interactions with the GTSM: he asked whether his startup needed to disclose information regarding his company's contract with a major company, possibly as material information under the exhaustive list of twelve circumstances, but the GTSM Board could or did not give clear answers as even they were unsure about the scope of how to properly regulate GISA companies or about the extent of differentiation from public companies; apparently, most of the time, even the staff of the GTSM expressed that GISA companies should be regulated just as much as public ones.
121 Thus, as this Article argues, the simplification of these rules is actually not sufficient for GISA companies as compared to the requirements for public companies.
122
Although the disclosure requirements for GISA companies are a liberalized version of the traditional mandated full-disclosure requirements, they must be simpler if the goal is to achieve regulatory humility. 123 In other words, humble regulation or light-touch regulations would be a more effective way to help people make better choices. 124 Furthermore, in the sense of humble regulation, the government should act as a "nudger," 125 and simpler disclosure would be a good way to nudge.
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The Public Integrative Counseling Mechanism in the GISA Board
After surpassing the first-stage examination of the innovation of a company applying for GISA registration, then comes the PICM. Under this mechanism, the GTSM undertakes a comprehensive examination of the financial and business conditions of the applicant company in coordination with an accounting firm or other external professional firms.
127
In theory, the goal of this mechanism is to provide advisory counseling on accounting, internal control, marketing, and legal affairs based on what the actual needs of the applicant company are deemed to be.
128
This mechanism is a major characteristic of the GISA Board, and differentiates the GISA Board from other private equity crowdfunding platforms elsewhere in the world (B3, B13).
129 As exemplified below by the experience of Interviewee C, the CEO of the startup, the GISA Board focuses primarily on this mechanism, treating capital formation as a secondary goal (B40).
130 That is, the most important goal of this mechanism is to assure investor protection (B14).
131
The manager handling the equity crowdfunding business for the GTSM added that because GISA companies are startups, the requirements for this mechanism are simplified (B43).
132 Nevertheless, the CEO of the startup with experience in raising capital on the GISA Board complained that, although the GTSM and KPMG, one of the top accounting firms in Taiwan, tried to counsel the startup on establishing accounting and financial systems similar to those of public companies, the GISA Board placed unnecessary and excessive regulatory burdens on the startup. In particular, this CEO added that for almost a whole year during the pre-registration counseling process of the GISA Board, a significant amount of time was spent towards meeting one of the requirements under the PICM: more standardized financial reports. For a small startup like his, he policy. It may be that simple 'light-touch' regulations more effectively help market participants improve their choices.").
125 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 9 (2013) ("Nudges consist of approaches that do not force anyone to do anything and that maintain freedom of choice, but that have the potential to make people healthier, wealthier, and happier."). added that resources should be invested to increase the operational workforce before being used to hire more financial or accounting staff (C2, C7).
133
Why does the PICM end up as an intrusive mechanism of investor protection? The GISA Board is operated by the GTSM, whose motivation to facilitate equity crowdfunding is influenced by the FSC -that is, compelling the GTSM to focus more on investor protection than on capital formation.
134 In contrast, helping startups raise capital would be a priority for a private equity crowdfunding platform with the goal of maximizing the number and size of successful projects. As of April 2015, the FSC permits private equity crowdfunding platforms.
136 As a result, there are now two kinds of equity crowdfunding platforms in Taiwan: the government-operated GISA Board and Private Portals. The Section below argues that, on the one hand, private portals have stronger incentives to facilitate equity crowdfunding than those of the GTSM.
137 On the other hand, not only do the GISA Regulations need to be simplified in the short run, but GTSM-enacted regulations governing equity crowdfunding through the Private Portal Regulations must also be simplified to "nudge" people in the long run.
The traditional methods of mandatory disclosure are too complicated for startups and are ineffective at protecting investors; retail investors tend to ignore tediously complex information (D4).
138 To be more specific, disclosure requirements could adopt simplified language, presentations, and scoring systems.
139 For example, the disclosure requirements for financial products in Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand emphasize the usage of simple words.
140 Rules in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Canada further emphasize that the words should 133 See Interview with C, supra note 113, at 2, 7. 134 be easy for investors to understand. 141 In the future, regulations governing equity crowdfunding could take this simple-disclosure approach (such as standardized short forms) toward investor protection (D5).
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C. Investor Issues
This Section sheds light on the legal issues that affect investors in the market: the types of investors, the investment caps, and the resale restrictions for equity crowdfunding in Taiwan.
Who Are the Investors?
Commentators have asserted that because crowdfunding provides the opportunity of investing in startups to retail investors, it "democratizes" access to investment.
143 Because crowdfunding also provides startups that lack access to wealthy investors with other opportunities to obtain sufficient funding from the investing public, it "democratizes" entrepreneurship.
144 Theoretically, equity crowdfunding investors can be ordinary and non-professional people.
However, the lawyer, a sophisticated investor, speculated that in the initial stage of the equity crowdfunding market, investors would not be mom-and-pop investors (D21).
145
The founder of the non-equity crowdfunding platform, based on his observations on the market trends of business models adopted in China and the U.S., predicted that as the equity crowdfunding market develops, professional investors would not dominate all the market, and more non-professional investors would enter this market; thus, to him, at least two types of equity crowdfunding markets would unfold: one for the investing crowd, and the other for angel investors (A5, A15).
146
In practice, the majority of GISA investors have been natural, nonprofessionals (E3, C22, C23 148 The reference to these official statistics came from my interview with the FSC official, who said that the specific numbers were not made public, but are on file with author.
investors in the marketplace might be one of the reasons why the GISA regulatory scheme is primarily concerned with investor protection (E4).
149 This official's comment may support the assertion that although the birth of the GISA Board is a legal transplant of the CROWDFUND Act, Taiwan's legal adaption or innovation reflects the preference for investor protection underlying local securities regulation.
150 In other words, the goal of the GISA Regulations is mainly to protect investors, and not to form capital, the primary focus of the CROWDFUND Act as it was adopted in 2012.
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Investment Caps
Because the GTSM places greater emphasis on investor protection, investment caps in the GISA Regulations are worth studying. Investments made by a non-professional investor through the GISA Board during the preceding year may not exceed NT$150,000, but the investment cap does not apply to the original shareholders of the issuer or professional investors.
152 For a natural person to qualify as a professional investor, the natural person must provide proof of financial capacity, showing assets of NT$30 million or more and possess ample professional knowledge of financial products or ample trading experience.
153
Compared to the rules on private placements in Taiwan, the threshold for a natural person to be a "professional investor" under the GISA Regulations is higher, and therefore more restrictive.
154 Given that GISA securities are publicly offered but have just been declared exempt from registration, GISA investors clearly require more investor protection than investors in the context of private placement. Hence, under the GISA Regulations, rules for professional investors are appropriate in this regard.
In the case of the investment cap for non-professional investors in the GISA Regulations, the appropriateness of the regulatory design merits rethinking. In fact, the original (much lower) investment cap for a non-professional natural person, NT$60,000, was increased to the current cap of NT$150,000 by the GTSM on May 25, 2015. 155 The initial NT$60,000 cap was imposed in early 2014, based on the $2,000 annual investment cap for investors whose annual income or net worth is less than $100,000 in the CROWDFUND Act of 2012;
156 the initial cap of NT$60,000, close to US$2,000, was determined based on local economic conditions in Taiwan (B27). 157 The investment caps for non-professional investors are stratified and comparably flexible in the CROWDFUND Act, but the cap for non-professional investors in Taiwan is the one-size-fits-all NT$60,000 (B28, D32) until May 25, 2015.
158
Even though the current cap was raised to NT$150,000 when Paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the GISA Regulations was amended in May 2015, the one-size-fits-all regulatory pattern remains.
159
In terms of the NT$60,000 initial cap, the FSC official explained that because investor protection is the primary concern of the GISA Regulations, the investment caps for both professional and non-professional investors are thus more stringent (E10).
The Resale of GISA Securities
According to the GISA Regulations, there is no ban on the resale of GISA securities, and so they can be freely transferred (B1, B8, E18).
163
Nevertheless, the CEO of a GISA company added that the resale rules are not clear (C28).
164 Though the GISA Regulations are modeled after the CROWDFUND Act, which in principle, forbids investors from transferring or reselling crowdfunded securities within one year (although there are some exceptions), 165 there is a major difference between the kinds of securities. GISA securities are inherently "publicly offered" but have just been exempted from registration so that GISA investors need more investor protection than those in the context of private placement.
166
Accordingly, there should be some restrictions on the transfer of GISA securities, such as the aforementioned lock-up period for transferring privately placed securities.
167 For the sake of regulatory congruency and because Taiwan's government prioritizes investor protection in regulating the equity crowdfunding market, this legal imperfection should be fixed by statutorily imposing a lock-up period, such as that used for privately placed securities, although the period could be shorter -perhaps, limited to one year.
D. Government Issues
This Section highlights the legal issues with regard to the scope of the exemption and the regulatory attitude towards equity crowdfunding in Taiwan, which serves as a prelude to my core theoretical arguments about government participants below.
To What Extent Are GISA Securities Exempted?
While GISA securities are "exempt securities" -that is, not subject to the registration requirement in Paragraph 1 of Article 22 of the SE Act in Taiwan -the question remains about the practical scope of this exemption. Specifically, the question of which law to apply in a GISA securities fraud case has not yet been answered (B4, B7) , 168 in Taiwan, let alone in the U.S. The government official asserted that the SE Act should not be the governing law in such a case, because even though GISA companies publicly offer their shares on the GISA Board, they are exempt from registering these shares with the FSC and thus are not public companies (E8, E9).
169
Therefore, only laws governing private companies, such as the Business Entity Accounting Act, should be applied when a lawsuit is filed (E8, E9).
170 This Article asserts that the anti-fraud provision (Paragraph 1 of Article 20 of the SE Act) should apply.
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A New Regulatory Philosophy of Equity Crowdfunding: Humble
Regulation through "Nudges"
The newness of equity crowdfunding as a way to raise capital in Taiwan has prompted the question of how we should regulate it. The regulatory model under the CROWDFUND Act resulted in the gradual blurring of the boundary between private placements and public offerings (E31).
172
Therefore, a new regulatory philosophy should be proposed to regulate equity crowdfunding. Even if the GTSM has at its core the goal of investor protection, and not that of capital formation, due to its status as a quasi-government foundation, it should adopt a new regulatory philosophy that allows the balance of the two regulatory goals to swing further towards capital formation. Because the GISA Regulations are imported mostly from the CROWDFUND Act of 2012 (B4, B49), the GTSM should not just borrow the form or the statutory text of the Act but must also derive its function or substance, i.e., how it primarily focuses on capital formation, from the Act.
173
As such, the GISA Regulations should take a more flexible regulatory philosophy -"humble" regulation or "light-touch" regulations -by employing such regulatory techniques as simplifications to "nudge" protected investors and to remove unnecessary red tape for startups seeking early stage funding.
174 The government official also recognized that future rules and regulations governing equity crowdfunding should keep 168 See Interview with B, supra note 113, at 4, 7. 169 See Interview with E, supra note 113, at 8, 9. pace with the times, so a new regulatory philosophy must eventually be adopted (E30).
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E. Crowdfunding Platform Issues
This Article puts the government in the limelight as the fourth participant in the equity crowdfunding market. In Taiwan, although the GTSM ostensibly reveals that the GISA Regulations and its sibling, the Private Portal Regulations, are patterned after the CROWDFUND Act, their practical or actual goal may differ from that of the U.S. model, due to the Taiwanese government's preferences for a higher level of investor protection.
From a public choice and comparative perspective, I further examine the current institutional framework of public plus private crowdfunding platforms, demonstrating that Taiwan's equity crowdfunding regulatory patterns reflect a transplantation of the U.S. model that tends to be more of form than of substance, that is, of copying the text rather than pursuing the goal of capital formation in reality.
The GISA Regulations from a Public Choice Perspective
The unique feature of equity crowdfunding in Taiwan is the role of the GTSM in operating the GISA Board. As explained above, the main goal of the GISA Regulations is to protect investors: the fact that a quasigovernmental organization runs the GISA Board may help achieve this goal, but it also generates some problems.
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From the "public choice" perspective, the political process is a competition among interest groups to secure rents with "public-spirited justifications used to disguise interest group rent seeking."
177 That is, interest groups will become involved in the political process to advocate for the common interests of their members.
178 One interest group rent-seeking activity is private law making, or working for their own interests by influencing the design or content of regulations.
179 However, interest groups lobby the government to enact laws that serve them or indirectly interfere with the process of law making, in effect "captur[ing]" lawmakers or regulatory agencies.
180
In accordance with the public choice perspective, this Article posits first that, in deciding whether to authorize private crowdfunding portals in the equity crowdfunding market, some interest groups might have influenced regulators to create the GISA Board in January 2014 as the only legal equity crowdfunding platform in Taiwan. Doing so thus created a barrier to enter the equity crowdfunding market for private portals, at least until private funding portals would be legalized.
181
Second, because the GTSM created and operates the GISA Board, its incentive to promote small business capital formation and to facilitate equity crowdfunding might differ from that of a private funding portal. 
The Power of Interest Groups
Before the recent authorization of private funding portals at the end of April 2015, the GTSM monopolized equity crowdfunding in Taiwan; the question of whether to lift the ban and to legalize equity crowdfunding run by private funding portals was open to debate (D35).
183 However, in the early stage of deliberating whether to lift the ban within Taiwan's government, interest groups might have lobbied regulators in deciding how to legalize equity crowdfunding in Taiwan, by ostensibly arguing for investor protection; specifically, some interest groups, namely securities firms, might have objected to the permission of internet enterprisers like Alibaba in China to provide financial services online, in order to entrench themselves in the traditional financial industry (D36).
184 This view was confirmed in an interview with a founder of a non-equity crowdfunding platform, who added that the plan to set up an equity crowdfunding portal was abandoned partly because of concerns and fears of groups of vested interests (A32). The government agency official did not think this was the case; 186 in its defense, the official said that the business interests of securities firms would not overlap with those of private funding portals because each group targets different customers or markets (E24, E25).
187 However, because the public choice explanation predicts that a gap may exist "between rhetoric (public-spirited [justifications]) and reality (rent-seeking),"
188 in the case of the creation of the GISA Board, we can infer that the government allowed the GISA Board to be run as the only equity crowdfunding platform in Taiwan due to investor protection, based on a public-spirited justification.
We can also infer that in reality this equity crowdfunding regulation resulted from interest groups (such as incumbent organized securities firms) securing barriers to the entry of private portals by urging the government to establish the GISA Board as a regulatory monopoly in the equity crowdfunding market. Additionally, we may infer that such interest groups might thus acquire rents at the expense of startups and retail investors, thereby weakening the democratization of access to capital and investments.
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In other words, Taiwan may have created its crowdfunding program in a way that was designed to limit its potential to compete with existing securities firms at least until private funding portals were authorized at the end of April 2015.
Bureaucratic Incentives for Running the GISA Board
The main incentive private funding portals have to facilitate equity crowdfunding is that it maximizes transaction volume by helping startups raise capital while presumably providing a certain level of investor protection. 190 In the process of fundraising, private funding portals do not promise that every project is sure to succeed, and instead conveys the possibility that projects on the funding portals may fail (A7, A9).
191 In contrast, in examining a startup applying to register on the GISA Board, the GTSM may consider whether the startup is very likely to succeed or not -that is, the government cannot take the risk that a GISA company could fail (A8). 189 See ORBACH, supra note 177, at 199 ("Industries and firms sometimes strategically support regulation, among other reasons because they realize that restrictive regulation will be adopted. The support may enable the industry (or industry members) to influence the design for its (or their) benefit.").
190 See supra Part II.A.1. 191 See Interview with A, supra note 113, at 7, 9. 192 See id. at 8. This might be because government agencies such as the FSC tend to be averse to risk, "defensive, threat-avoiding, scandal-minimizing," and "reluctant Based on the responses from the interviews, if a GISA company were to fail or commit fraud, the FSC and the GTSM would risk severe public criticism. To avoid risking public criticism, the GTSM pays the closest attention to the success rate and also places the greatest emphasis on investor protection by all means, including the PICM.
193 This mindset might lead it to compromise the promotion of capital promotion to an extent (B14, B49, D13, D34).
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Additionally, the government (represented by the president of the GTSM) indicated that there is an effect of government certification or endorsement derived from registering on the GISA Board to raise capital,
195 so the GTSM would carefully examine the integrity of startups applying for GISA registration (E3, B23, E1).
196 All in all, these measures are taken to ensure a very high level of investor protection, which demonstrates that the GTSM's incentive to operate an equity crowdfunding portal differs from those of private funding portals.
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Political influence over the GTSM may further account for its distinct incentive to facilitate equity crowdfunding in Taiwan. The Investor Protection Center ("IPC") in Taiwan serves the same function as U.S. lawyer-driven class actions; because of the dominant government presence in the IPC, it is very likely that the potential arbitrariness of the IPC's decisions are subject to possible undue influence by other government interests. Just as in the case of the IPC, the creation of the GISA Board in January 2014 demonstrated the Taiwanese government's preference for public rather than private enforcement in protecting investors. 199 The GTSM's control over the GISA Board, a nonprofit foundation controlled by the FSC, 200 may be the reason that the statute emphasizes investor protection over capital formation. 201 Put simply, the monopoly on the equity crowdfunding market that the GISA Board held until April 2015, illustrates that the government prefers the quasi-regulatory body, the GTSM, over private portals for enforcing investor protection.
Regulating Equity Crowdfunding in a Changing Landscape:
Licensing Private Portals under the Public Plus Private DoubleTrack System
Even if there are some imperfections in the GISA Board as it is run by the GTSM, the GTSM played an interim role in setting an example of running an equity crowdfunding platform in Taiwan legitimately, but the excessive level of investor protection should be reconsidered (D34).
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The spirit of crowdfunding lies in "democratizing" access to investment as well as to capital.
203 To achieve this goal, the lawyer asserted that the equity crowdfunding market could form new capital in a more effective way, upon liberalizing and opening the market to private funding portals (D11).
204
A breakthrough in Taiwan's crowdfunding regulatory pattern, which took place at the end of April 2015, has been that the FSC authorized private portals to administer equity crowdfunding, apart from the GISA Board. On April 30, 2015, the FSC mandated the GTSM to act as the regulator and to promulgate Private Portal Regulations as a governing law for crowdfunding issues on private platforms.
205 Taiwan's Cabinet (the Executive Yuan) developed this public plus private double-track system (the Double-Track system) as early as the end of 2014.
206
Substantively speaking, the CROWDFUND Act established funding portals as private gatekeepers to ensure the integrity and thoroughness of the crowdfunded securities offered.
207 Techniques to regulate funding portals include a requirement to educate investors to ensure that investors affirm that they understand the level of risk in startups and small issuers as well as the risk of illiquidity, and to ensure that investors do not invest more than the aggregate amounts that they are allowed to purchase across all platforms.
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More importantly, equity crowdfunding portals need to act as private gatekeepers with the ability to conduct due diligence on behalf of retail investors to disclose crowdfunded security risks. Therefore, the licensure of private portals in Taiwan is predicated on the fact that they are supposed to possess the ability to perform due diligence on the basic competence of crowdfunding issuers. A gatekeeper plays two roles in preventing wrongdoing: first, in order to prevent wrongdoing, the gatekeeper denies a corporate issuer access to the capital market by withholding its consent or necessary collaboration; second, the gatekeeper acts as a "reputational intermediary" to enable investors to rely on the disclosures or assurances made by the issuer. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFES-SIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2006) . 208 See supra Part I.B.4. 209 The ability to perform due diligence is an important way to overcome information asymmetries between issuers and investors and enables equity crowdfunding platforms to thrive in that these platforms act as third-party quality certification agencies, and that their reputations can be leveraged if they are trustworthy intermediaries. See Agrawal et al., supra note 29, at 18, 20, 22, 24-25, 28, 30.
precondition for obtaining a license to operate a private funding portal (A7, A13, A30).
210
There are some emerging concerns regarding Taiwan's Double-Track system. First, the GTSM appears to play the part of referee or regulator for private portals while doubling as a player in the equity crowdfunding marketplace. Even if the equity crowdfunding market were liberalized and open to private funding portals, the GISA Board would still be the strongest competitor against or even come to dominate over private portals, although the former is no longer a regulatory monopoly in a formal sense. Specifically, the FSC gave the GTSM a mandate to regulate anyone wishing to be a player in the equity crowdfunding market.
211 The conflict of interest may be disconcerting -that the GTSM, running the GISA Board, is both a player and the referee.
Because of this infrastructure, it is doubted whether the GTSM might set the game rules and enforce them righteously. On the one hand, even if the Private Portal Regulations were somewhat relaxed in January 2016, 212 with the GTSM as the direct regulator of private portals, the GTSM might have stringently crafted the Private Portal Regulations to suit the incumbent player, the GISA Board. In concrete terms, compared to the Private Portal Regulations, the GISA Regulations could provide advantages for the GISA Board in running a more successful crowdfunding business.
See Interview with A, supra note 113, at 7, 13, 30. Private Portal Regulations require that before disclosing capital-raising information of crowdfunding issuers on websites, private portals not only assure the quality of issuers' internal controls, accounting, and management integrity, but also conduct due diligence checks on their offering circulars to ensure that no material deficiencies or abnormalities exist. PRIVATE PORTAL REGULATIONS, supra note 28, arts. 20, 24 ¶ 1. 211 See supra Parts III.E.2-3. 212 According to the GTSM, after referring to foreign legislative developments and domestic business demands, under the principle of risk management, this partial relaxation is aimed at making the operation of private crowdfunding platforms more flexible and facilitates the fundraising of small startups. Order of the GTSM, ZhengGui-Xin-Zi No. 10500006361 (passed on Jan. 8, 2016) (Taiwan).
213 For example, as mentioned in Part II.B.1, the total paid-in capital for the GISA company must not exceed NT$50 million, whereas the cap for the total paid-in capital of crowdfunding issuers listed on private portals is NT$30 million, according to Article 19 of the Private Portal Regulations. Although both public and private platforms target small companies, the higher registration cap on the GISA Board gives itself an advantage over private portals in attracting issuers. Furthermore, the GISA Board is more successful in competing for crowdfunding issuers in that the investment cap for non-professional investors on the GISA Board is higher than on other private portals. Specifically, as discussed in Part II.B.2, the annual investment cap for a non-professional investor through the GISA Board is NT$150,000, whereas Article 26 of Private Portal Regulations provides that investment made by a nonprofessional investor through each private portal during the preceding year may not exceed NT$100,000. A non-professional investor can thus invest more on the GISA From a public choice perspective, the GISA Board enjoys regulatory advantages that may be government-conferred rents, created by erecting barriers to entry, similar to restrictive licensing or permit regimes. Consequently, even if private portals had been allowed to list crowdfunded securities since the end of April 2015, the Double-Track regulatory scheme de facto has created anticompetitive effects in favor of the GTSM's potentially monopolistic activity. 214 For example, the GTSM had run the GISA Board since January 2014, and there have already been 62 startups registered on the GISA Board with near NT$200 million raised at least as of December 2014.
215
On the contrary, as discussed just below, after the authorization of private portals in April 2015, two securities firms, MasterLink Securities Corporation and First Securities, were licensed to operate equity crowdfunding transactions. But possibly due to the strict restrictions on platforms and investors under the Private Portal Regulations, at least until December 11, 2015, there has not been any startup registered on these two private platforms. 216 This comparison might illustrate that the GISA Board enjoys advantages over other private platforms in running the crowdfunding business either legally or institutionally.
On the other hand, it was not until December 2015 when the first pure equity crowdfunding registered portal, "Startup Shares," started its operation. 217 As pure private portals take time and money to form, all of the earliest private equity crowdfunding platforms surely took place through existing securities firms. Two securities firms, MasterLink Securities Corporation and First Securities, were licensed to administer equity crowdfunding transactions as early as June 2015. 218 The reason for this may be that at the end of April 2015, the FSC ordered that any existing broker or private entity wanting to operate an equity crowdfunding business be licensed as a special broker for equity crowdfunding business only. The issue was that the establishment cost for a pure private portal to acquire this license was at least NT$50 million higher than that for an existing broker.
219
At least in terms of the pace to start operations, pure equity crowdfunding registered portals may be at a major disadvantage compared to existing brokers due to higher licensure costs so that pure portals are surely slow movers in entering the equity crowdfunding market. 220 Taken together, Taiwan's government may yoke pure private equity crowdfunding portals by creating entry barriers, hence vesting dominance of the marketplace in the hands of the GTSM and existing brokers.
Furthermore, since the GTSM promulgated the Private Portal Regulations, which were sure to be approved by the FSC thereafter, the current regulations on private platforms still appear to be as much pro-investor protection as the GISA Regulations. For instance, during the examination of a company applying for GISA registration, the GTSM will undertake the PICM to assure the quality of startups' accounting, internal control, and corporate governance, while seriously examining the integrity of startups' management. 221 Similarly, according to Article 20 of the Private Portal Regulations, prior to disclosing the capital-raising information of crowdfunding issuers on websites, private portals are required to warrant the quality of issuers' internal controls, accounting, and management integrity.
222 These mechanisms are designed to ensure a high level of investor protection.
Because the GTSM operates the GISA Board, the GISA Regulations require more emphasis to be placed on investor protection than on capital formation.
223 As the Private Portal Regulations were enacted by the GTSM and mostly patterned after the GISA Regulations, Taiwan's gov-ernment simply dressed the regulatory pattern of the GISA Board in "new clothes" as the Private Portal Regulations.
As just mentioned above, even though the Private Portal Regulations were partially loosened in January 2016, this small-scale relaxation was achieved with a view to meeting business demands for legal flexibility in, as Ming-chung Tseng (the former FSC chairman) admitted, that there was not a startup registered on the two private portals formed by existing securities firms at all and that the FSC hence decided to liberalize the Private Portal Regulations after reviewing their strictness. 224 The remark of the former FSC Chairman just demonstrated how the initial version of the Private Portal Regulations was more pro-investor protections. Therefore, both the aforementioned regulations of Taiwan's equity crowdfunding market are essentially still primarily focused on investor protection.
225
Even though the equity crowdfunding market has been open to private portals since the end of April 2015, with the GTSM dominating the marketplace by acting as both a player and regulator simultaneously, the changing landscape of equity-crowdfunding regulation is proving to be a change in name only. Moreover, Taiwanese regulators have tried to maintain a fair-and-even playing field to ensure the orderly functioning of Taiwanese equity crowdfunding markets, but the framework and enforcement structure for private portals may be so restrictive that even existing brokers as forerunners -with an advantage over pure online platforms -failed to attract any listing as of December 2015. Clearly, Taiwanese regulators failed to strike such a balance as Mary L. Schapiro, the former SEC Chairman, asserted in implementing the CROWDFUND Actbetween optimizing investor protection and not hindering the creative impetus of the burgeoning capital formation. make the GISA Board a monopolistic equity crowdfunding platform in Taiwan and thus make it become an entry barrier to emerging private funding portals in the first place.
230 Even after the authorization of fully private portals, the two earliest crowdfunding platforms were formed by existing securities firms. At least in terms of the pace to start operations, existing brokers had major advantages over the new pure private portals thanks to lower licensing costs.
When it comes to public groups, Anthony Ogus observed:
We can then recognise [sic] that interventionist law is a heterogeneous product: preferences may vary between countries, regions and localities as to the different combinations of the levels of legal intervention and of the price which must be paid for them. If this is the case, there is no necessary expectation that competition between national legal systems will lead to convergence, since much will depend on national preferences regarding the level of protection.
231
The GISA Regulations count as part of securities regulation, which is also a type of interventionist law. Given that the official representing the competent authority stated that 75 percent of GISA investors are natural, non-professional people, and so investor protection is therefore extremely important, Taiwan's local preference for supplying higher investor protection is clearly illustrated. The problem that arises from this preference is the increase in compliance costs that startups incur.
232
Moreover, the incentive of the GTSM might thus differ from that of a private funding portal due to the dominant presence of the competent authority, the FSC. Furthermore, even though private portals have been permitted to list crowdfunded securities since the end of April 2015, the Double-Track regulatory scheme is favorable to the GTSM's substantively monopolistic activity in simultaneously acting as a player and regulator in the marketplace.
Whether in the context of facilitative law (e.g., contract and property) or interventionist law (e.g., tort and regulation), 233 a comparative law scholar has argued that "[w]hile constitutional law and company law seem to be very different, convergence in these two areas of law shows a number of parallels," that "[f]irst, in both areas of law, it has been found that countries have converged in a number of dominant legal policies," and that " [ In the case of equity crowdfunding regulations in Taiwan, both the GISA Regulations and the Private Portal Regulations reflect a regulatory convergence of more form or rhetoric (i.e. the textual details of the law) and of less function or substance (i.e. the main regulatory policy -small business capital promotion). The excessive level of investor protection embedded in these two regulations might place heavy compliance burdens on small startups. In other words, from a path-dependence perspective, even though Taiwan's government transplanted formal regulatory techniques from the CROWDFUND Act into both the regulations, the local contextual dissimilarity may result in the substantive core or the legislative purpose of the JOBS Act -a primary focus on capital formation -neglected in the importation.
CONCLUSION
After the CROWDFUND Act was passed in the U.S. in 2012, the idea of equity crowdfunding has gained incredible momentum in helping startups obtain early seed capital elsewhere around the world, particularly in Taiwan. Only two years after its passage, Taiwan's government created the GISA Board and enacted the GISA Regulations and then shortly thereafter the Private Portal Regulations. Although both regulations are mostly a product of the legal transplantation of the CROWDFUND Act, a closer examination of Taiwan's rules, structures, and procedures as well as of the practical experiences of some of the typical participants, reflects Taiwan's path dependence on the high level of investor protection underlying local securities regulations.
This Article argues that the legal transplantation of the GISA Regulations and the Private Portal Regulations has both bright sides and dark sides. The bright side of Taiwan's two-step liberalization policy, the Double-Track system to legalize equity crowdfunding, is that the GISA Board can play an interim leading role in shaping how an equity crowdfunding platform should be run legitimately among its private peers in the near future. The dark side, from a public choice perspective, is that groups with vested interests, such as existing securities firms, may lobby to create entry barriers for potential private equity crowdfunding platforms. Nevertheless, the conflict of interest with the GTSM persists with respect to its incentive to run the GISA Board, due to the dominant government presence, as well as its dual roles as a player and referee in equity-crowdfunding regulation.
As demonstrated through doctrinal, qualitative and public choice analyses, both regulations in Taiwan may cause unbearable compliance costs to startups, ultimately compromising the goal of small business capital formation. The legal transplant of U.S. regulation of equity crowdfunding in Taiwan seems to be turning out to be simply one of form rather than of substance -with vast implications, particularly in terms of Taiwan's role and position in the rapidly changing "startup" global economy.
